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INFANTICIDE: THE WORTH OF AN INFANT
UNDER LAW*
by
CATHERINE DAMME**
INTRODUCrION
[AfterJoannaleVaghhad beencharged with the deathofherdaughter,] [t]hejuryde odio etatia
in 1284found thatshehadkilledherin afrenzywhileravingmad .... EdwardIpardonedherat
once on the strength ofthat verdict."
Because the judge, prosecutor and defense attorney agreed that 19 year old MelissaNorriswas
insane in April [19761 when she beat her 3-month-old son to death while trying to exorcise
"Satan", she was found not guilty by reason ofinsanity and will not go to prison. [Because the
judge laterruled] that Miss Norris now is sane, she also cannot be sent to a mental hospital. So
shewalkedoutofthe ...courtroomfree.'
Although over seven hundred years separates the two infanticide prosecutions
described above, the contemporary societies' attitudes toward this crime dictated
identicaloutcomes-acquittal orpardonbyreasonoftemporaryinsanity.
How asocietyvaluesthehealth, safety andwelfareofitsmembersisreflectedinhow
andtowhatextentthestateprotectsitscitizensthroughlaw.
An unsettled aspect ofthe state's obligation to its people is whether the infant can
command the samedegree ofprotection as othercitizens. This paperwillexamine this
question andwill surveyhow theinfant's life is valued andprotected and atwhattime
theinfantacquirespersonhoodsufficienttocommandfullprotectionofthestate.
The focus ofthe paper will be on infanticide and its special status; the context for
analysis will be the Anglo-American legal system. I will look at English medieval
attitudes towards the practice ofinfanticide in ecclesiastical courts, in secular (royal)
tribunals, and at common law, and will trace the evolution ofthis body oflaw which
culminatedinaseriesofEnglishstatutes specificallyproscribingchild-killing.
Penalties for infanticide will be ofparticular interest, and comparison will be made
to penalties for homicide as well as the use ofthe special defence ofcriminal insanity.
From the historical perspective of medieval attitudes, I will search for evidences of
survival ofthose views in laws in the United States relating to (1) abortion, (2) proxy
consent to medical treatment, and (3) euthanasia ofdefective newborns. Perhaps an
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exploration ofthefeelingtoward child-killing inhistory and law will betterthe under-
standingofsociety'sattitudesembodiedinlawconcerningtheworthofaninfant'slife.
What is proposed here is that infanticide has always been unique in history in its
incidence, commission, pleading, defence, and penalty. Infanticide, without regard to
societal mores, is simple homicide-the taking ofanother's life. But within the Anglo-
Americanjurisprudentialtraditions, the "another's life" has notincluded thenewborn
infant. Indeed, the fact that infanticide has a demonstrated separateness in history
attests totheinfant's special status. Moreover, theinescapable conclusion to be drawn
from the laws proscribing infanticide is that this special status is in fact lesser status
thanthatofanadultoreven amorefullydevelopedchild.
INFANTICIDE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
Medieval English society had a decidedly ambivalent attitude toward infanticide.
While contemporary commentators on secular law such as Bracton and Fleta defined
homicide and murder in ways which clearly included an infant in rerum natura,5
the king's justice seldom extended to such occurrences, and jurisdiction fell upon
ecclesiasticalcourts.
That infanticide did occur frequently in medieval England is beyond dispute. A
markedly higher male sex ratio among heirs (four to three) in Inquisitionpost mortem
from 1250 to 1348 and from 1430 to 1545 led Josiah Russell to speculate that female
infants had been victims of infanticide.' And, after examining serf lists of the late
1300s, Russellcommented:
The difference in numbers of boys and girls is extraordinary out of 128 children 78 males to
46females .... Either theliquidation offemale among theserfs was much morecommon than
amongthe favored class or there is some peculiarity in thecollection ofthe evidence. The first
possibilityhas some basis in the necessity for restricting the number of children inview ofthe
limitedopportunitiesopentopeopleoftheclas.Thepossibility ofapecuiarbiasinthecollection
oftheevidenceissomewhatmoredifficulttoexplain.'
Thetheorythatthevictimsweremostoftenfemaleisalsoinharmonywiththeneedsof
whatwasapredominantlyagrarianandmilitarysociety.6
Moreover, anexamination ofthechurchcourtrecordsofCanterburyinthefifteenth
centuryadequatelysupportsthecontentionthatsuchcrimes didindeed takeplace, but
the incidence is impossible to gauge. As R. H. Helmholz comments: "One wants
inevitablytoknow, howmuchinfanticidewasthere?And tothis questionthe[Canter-
buryparishrecords]givenoreliable answer.Thelargestnumberofprosecutions forthe
crimeIhavefoundforanyoneyearisfour.'7
The paucity ofquantitative data should not invalidate the theory that infanticide
'Cyril C. Means ., 'Thephoenx ofabortional freedom', N.Y. LawForum, 1971, 17: 335410,
pp. 339-340 and 349; H. G. Richardson and 0. 0. Sayles (eds.), Fketa, London, Bernard Quaritch,
SeldenSociety, 1955,p. 60.
' Barbara A. Kellum, 'Infanticide in England in the later Middle Ages', History ofChildhood
Quarterly, 1974,1:367-388,p.368.
'Ibid.,p. 368.
Mary M. McLaughlin, 'Survivors and surrogates', in L.DeMause (ed)., The historyofchildhood,
NewYork,PsychohistoryPres, 1974,p. 120.
7 R. H. Helmholz, 'Infanticide in the Province ofCanterbury during the fifteenth century', History
ofChildhodQuarterly, 1974, 1:379-390, p. 384.
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was fairlywidespread. Records, bothecclesiastical and secular, were often notkept as
to every crime or sin. And those records that do survive are often fragmentary. More
important, the circumstances surrounding the act of infanticide almost dictated a
dearth ofcomprehensive detection and consequent documentation for the following
reasons. First, the most common means ofinfanticide was overlaying (i.e., taking the
infant into bed and suffocating it with one's body). Overlaying, ofcourse, could be
accidental, but while lack ofintent mitigated the degree ofpenalty, it did not absolve
the perpetrator.8 Death by overlaying become theconcern ofthe church, exclusively.
And the large number ofreferences to it in penitentials and other church documents
underlines the fact that it must have been a persistent and quite common problem.
Second, it was a secret crime. The evidence (the infant's corpse) could easily be des-
troyed in the rural environment. Thus, it may be surmised that the church was not
cognizantofthemajorityofinfanticidesthattookplace.
Barbara Kellum reports thatColumban, in c. 600, had setpenance foroverlaying at
one year on bread and water and two additional years without flesh or wine.9 The
penance couldbereduced ifthesinnerwas aserforverypoor.10 Thispenancebecame
fairly standard, and Kellumpoints outthatitwas relativelylight"when oneconsiders
that the punishment for even accidental killing of an adult was five years, three of
theseonbreadandwater".11
Bartholomew ofExeteralso referredtooverlayingin thetwelfthcenturyanddecreed
thestandardpenance. Healsoincludedanewmethodofcommission,thatofscalding.12
Evidently, such accidents, which occurred while the child was on the hearth, were
prevalentenoughforinclusioninthepenitentials. Thethirteenth-centurypenitentialof
Thomas of Chobham brought yet other methods of infanticide into officialpurview,
such as refusal to nurse and death by the mother's own hand.18 These acts were tech-
nicallytermedhomicide, butpriestsweregrantedwidediscretion(despitethestandard
three-yearpenance)inestablishingtheappropriatepunishments.
In addition to penitentials, church legislation ofthe middle 1200s repeatedly spoke
ofthe dangers ofoverlaying, a further testament to its prevalence. As set forth in the
StatutesofWinchesterIin 1224:
[65] Sub interminatione anathematis sepius in eccicsiis inhibeatur ne mulieres infantulos suos in
lectissuisiuxtasecollocentneeosopprimantdormiedo.
Under thret ofexcommunication from the church, women should be restramined from keeping
theirchildren closebyinbedlesttheysmotherthemwhileinsleep.1'
AndagainintheConstitutionesCuiusdamEpiscopiof1225x 1230:
SIbid.,pp. 381-382.
'John R. McNeil, and Helena M. Gamer (trans.), Medieval handbooks ofpenance, New York,
ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1938,p.254.
1Kellum, op. cit., note4above, p. 369.
Ibid., p. 369.
"Ibid., p. 370.
1Ibid., p.370.
14F. M. Powiche, Councils and synods with other documents relating to the English Church, II.,
1205-1265, Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1964, p. 136(trans.:Damme).
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[5] Feminaetiammoneanturutpucros suoscautealant,etiuxtasedenoctenoncollocentteneros
neopprimantur.
Woman again are to be admonished to takecare that they do nothold theirchildrenclose by in
thenightksttheybesmothered."'
OncemoreintheStatutesofConventryissuedbetween 1224x 1237:
Item, districte precipiatur ut mulla mulier ponat puerum suum in lecto secum, nisi sit ad minus
triumannorumvelcirciter.
Likewise, it is to be known that no woman lay down her child in bed with her unless it is or is
aboutthreeyearsofage."
At least fifteen other references are made in ecclesiastical statutes in the councils of
the erato the dangers oftaking achild into bed.17 Whilethe penance might appearto
be shockinglylightby modem penalstandards, in fact, itwas merely a recognition by
the church ofa method ofpopulation control by the poor that may have been neces-
sary,inmanycases,forsurvival.
Anotherfactordiscernible amongtheseecclesiastical statutes isthatalladmonitions
are addressed to females (mulier orfemina), never to a male or evenparens. Indeed,
mostprosecutions, both secular and ecclesiastical, wereofwomen;15 moreover,from
the use ofthepossessive (suwn) withpuerun, it is clearthat the churchwas concerned
with the classic form ofinfanticide, i.e., a mother, not an unrelated woman, smother-
ingherinfant.
Overlaying, while asin, was considered avenial onebymanypenitentials. Evidence
ofits importance can be found in the following excerpt from Instructionsforparish
priestsin 1359-68:
Pore&nakedandhong,
HastthouI-sokeretmekely?
Hastthouinherterowthe[compassion]I-had,
Ofhemthatwerenedebe-stad[bestand]?
Toseke&soreandprisonerus
I-herberst [entetained] alleweyfrus?
HastthouI-lyuedalsoinchost&stryf
Wyththeymeyne[household]andwyththeywyf?
HastthoualsobyhyreI-layn,
Andsoby-tweneyoutheychyldeI-slayn?
Alsotheychyldrethatwereschvwes [wicked]
Hasthou1-taghthemgodethenes[manners]?"
Herethesin ofoverlaying aninfantisjuxtaposed withnotbeingagoodsamaritanand
not teaching shrewish children good manners. What might the parish priest have
considered appropriate punishment for such minor sins, which here included the
takingofahumanlife?
The penance for overlaying, however, was not always the three-year abstinence
discussed earlier, forin the later Middle Ages thepenalties were not onlymore severe,
1 Ibid.,p. 183 (trans.:Damme) TIbid., p. 214(trans.:Damme)
17Ibid.,pp.2,32,70,140-141,204-205,214,234-235,274,352,410,453,457,520,589-590,634-635.
Helmholz, op.cit.,note7above, p. 385.
Kellum, op.cit.,note4above, p. 367.
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butmorepubliclystigmatizing. FromhisreviewofCoventrychurchrecords, Helmholz
reportsthefollowing:
Joan Rose was convicted at Canterbury in 1470 ofkilling her son. Thejudge ordered that Joan
should dress in penitential garb and "go before the procession in the parish church ofHythe on
three Sundays with awaxcandle ofhalfapound in her right hand and the knifewith which she
killedtheboy, orasimilarknife,inherleft."Shewasalsoorderedtogotwicearoundthemarkets
of Canterbury, Faversham, and Ashford in a similar fashion. This was obviously meant as a
humiliatingpublicadmissionofguilt,andasawarningtoothersagainstthecrimeofinfanticide.A
Helmholz continues that six public whippings were meted out for child suffocation
coupled withfornication, and contrasts this to the identical penalty for a man who
confessed to fathering a bastard.21 A conclusion might be drawn that such a harsh
penance for child suffocation as compared to the three-year penance discussed above,
mayhave beenaresultofthesexualmisconduct (fornication) ratherthanthetakingof
theinfant's life. However, overlayingwaselevated inecclesiastical statutes ofExeterII
in 1237fromavenialtoamajorsin.'2
Thevariationinpenanceforoverlayingand suffocationpointsup acharacteristicof
ecclesiastical justice, that of the wide discretion afforded the parish in setting the
penance. Within a parish, bishops, archdeacons, rural deans, capitular bodies, and
others all had various degrees ofjurisdiction over public sins.'8 Within thisjurisdic-
tional morass, the parish priest, or whichever church official was dealing with the
infanticide, was granted agreatdealoflatitude in fixingpenalty. Notwithstanding the
precisepunishmentsreviewedherein,therewasno"mandatorysentencing," butrather,
theofficiatingbodycouldalwayslookatanymitigatingcircumstances thatmighthave
promptedanactofinfanticide.
The mostpersuasivepointformitigationwas, aptly, poverty. Indeed, somepeniten-
tials such as that of Columban, institutionalized this."4 Another factor the church
would take notice ofwas intent; this was potentially crucial when one considers that
themet-hodfrequentlyemployedwasoverlaying.
Discretion was commonly exercised in the burden ofproofrequired in a medieval
churchcourt. Uponentering apleaofnotguilty, theaccusedwouldberequiredby the
judge to bring forward persons (called compurgators) to swear an oath that they
believed her (or, occasionally, his) plea. When compurgators were found, came forth
and swore, the charge was dismissed. The number of compurgators necessary was
established by the court which, in assessing the number, took into consideration the
typeofcrimeandthepersonsandcircumstancesinvolved."
Thus, even though medieval society termed an infanticide a homicide, it also rea-
listically looked on it as a phenomenon that took place frequently, within the family,
and may have been dictated by pressures of survival. For the poor were, in Mary
McLaughlin's words, "at tbe mercy of the chronic cycles of famine, malnutrition,
"Helmnholz,op.cit.,note7above,p. 383.
1Ibid.,p. 384.
"Mclaughlin, op.cit.,note6above,p. 157(note105).
" Helmnholz, op.cit.,note7above,p.385.
"Kellun, op.cit.,note4above,p. 368.
uHelmholz, op.cit.,note7above,p. 383.
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disease and death, and their children were by far the most common victims of the
parental negligence and despair, ofthe abandonment, exposure, and even infanticide,
which mustbecounted amongmajorthreatstoyounglife .. .".A.. McLaughlin goes on
to point out "[i]f all of these practices were related to the pressures, material and
psychological, ofasocietylivingoftenatthelimits ofsubsistence, theyarerelatedmost
specifically to the problem of population, or 'family', control in a time when the
means of limiting births were totally inadequate, if not, for practical purposes,
virtuallynon-existent".27
Other social motives for infanticide are suggested, particularly the prevalence of
promiscuity. Bigamy, a consequence of secret marriages, was quite common,2' and
controversies overinheritances werelegion." Thevulnerability ofillegitimatechildren
toinfanticidewasthusextreme. Anotherpotentialvictimwastheunbaptizedchildwho
wasthoughttobein thepowerofSatan."' Superstitions astochangelingchildren(i.e.,
those who cried) who would disappear ifplaced near thefire on the hearth added to a
newborn'speril.81 Kellumpoints outthatpriests ofteninstructed midwives toperform
a "quasi-baptismal" ceremony at the moment of birth for the protection of the
neonate.82
That the church alone tookjurisdiction in these matters is in itselfofgreat signifi-
cance when punishments for infanticide are analysed. For even though the church
looked upon infanticide as the taking ofanother's life, intentionally or negligently, it
was estopped by the crown from rendering ajudgment that would shed blood (i.e.,
the death penalty)." Evidently, the taking ofan infant's life, while certainly not con-
doned, was understood. Moreover, atemporary, sometimes apublic and humiliating,
penancewasdeemedappropriate andsufficientpunishmentforthissin.
Although the crown did not normally takejurisdiction over infanticides, some, but
veryfew, references tochild-killingin variouscoroners' rollscanbefound.Thislackof
jurisdiction isunderstandable inlightofecclesiasticalpowerinthesphereofpublicsin.
However, statutorily at least, in the early twelfth century under the laws ofHenry I,
the royal courts did take cognizance of the crime if the perpetrator was a person
other than the parents." This was merely the beginning, for as the medieval age drew
to a close, royal courts steadilyencroached upon ecclesiastical control over this, and
indeedmostforms, ofantisocial(criminal)behaviour.
What did constitute homicide in the King's courts? Fleta defined this crime in the
following:
Homicideistheslayingofmanbymanwithevilintent, andtheremaybebodilyslayingeitherby
deedorbyword:bydeed,asinjustice,bynecessity,bychanceorwillfuly:byword, asbyproept,
bycounselorbyforbidding."
" McLaughin, op.cit.,note6above,p. 119.
2Ibid., p. 120.
" Kellum, op.cit.,note4above,p. 377.
" Ibid.,p. 377.
toIbid.,p. 377.
I1Ibid.,p. 377.
"Ibid.,p. 377.
" Helmholz, op.cit.,note7above, p. 384.
" McLaughlin, op.cit.,note6above,p. 157(note105).
"RichardsonandSayles,op.cit., note3above,p. 60.
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But he, and his teacher Bracton, expressed strongfeelings toward the life ofthe infant
intheformoftheviable(quickened)foetus:
He, too, in strictness is a homicide who has pressed upon a pregnant woman or has given her
poison or has struck her in order to procure an abortion or to prevent conception, ifthe foetus
was already formed and quickened, and similarly he who has given oraccepted poison with the
intention of preventing procreation or conception. A woman also commits homicide if, by a
potionorthelike,shedestroysaquickenedchildinherwomb."
Fleta also may have given a clue to the prevalence of infanticides of illegitimate
infantsorgrosslydeformedneonates,forhedefined afreeman asthefollowing:
Among freemen theremay not bereckoned thosewhoare born ofunlawful intercourse, such as
adultery and the like (by-blow, spurious, bastard) and others begotton ofunlawful intercourse,
nor those who are procreated ervertedly, aginst the way ofhuman kdnd, as for example, ifa
woman bring forth a monster or a prodigy. Nevertheless, the offspring in whom nature has in
some small measure, though not extravantly, added members or diminished them-a if he
should have six fingers or only four-he should certainly be included among freemen. Men may
alsobecassiiedaccordingtowhethertheyaremaleorfemaleorhermaphrodite. Anhermaphro-
dite, to be sure, is classed with male or female, according to the predominance of the sexual
organs.87
Clearly, thesepitiful "non-persons" werevulnerable to the murderous attacks oftheir
progenitors.
The child-killing cases that do survive in secular court records are woefully inade-
quate foranalysis. In fact, because the age is almost never recorded, these reports are
probably cases of an older child who merits the adult protections ofthe crown and
whosedeathbysuspiciousmeansmeritstheking'scognizanceandjustice.
Forexample, inthePleas ofthe Crown atYorkbetween 1218 and 1219, thefollow-
ingisrecorded:
WiliamsonofLeciawasfounddrownedandLeciahismotherfirstfound him. Shehasnot come,
butitissaid thatsheisdead, andthejurorssaythat shehasgone into theland ofJerusalem, and
theviLageofWalton,(nearWakefield)hasacnowledgedthis.Bcause noonewhohasbeen attached
cango out of thelandbefore the coming oftheJustices,it isadjudged that Lecia'ssurities are in
mercy, namely William the reeve ofWalton and Gilbert ofWalton. No one is suspected. Judg-
ment, Misadventure.'6
The fact that William's death was by drowning, a fairly common form ofinfanticide
accordingtoKellum,39 andthefactthathismotherfoundhim, mightlead to specula-
tionthatWilliamwas avictim ofinfanticide. But, as the cases here are quoted in their
entirety, suchspareaccountsdiscouragesuchspeculation.
ThecaseofMaletaisalsopitifulinitscrypticdetail:
Maetadaughter ofWalterofMetheywas drowned in aditch. Walter her father found her. No
oneissuspected.Judgement, Misadventure."
"Ibid.,p. 60. 8?Ibid.,pp. 14-15.
8D. M. Stenton (ed.),RollsoftheJustices inEyre, Yorkshire, 3Henry III(1218-1219), London,
BenardQuaritch,SeldenSociety, 1937,p. 183.
" Kellum,op.cit.,note4above, p. 372.
" Stenton, op. cit.,note38above,p. 185.
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Andagain, otherdrownings arerecorded:
AdamofMarrwasfounddrowned.Emmahismotherfoundhim.Nooneissuspected. Judgment,
Misadventure."1
Hugh son of Norman in the same way was found drowned. No one is suspected. Judgment,
Misadventure."
Anumber ofcases ofthis type appearinthePlacita Corone, butagain, itis doubtful
that these are records of infant drownings. In fact, the Latin transcriptions of these
cases use the words filius orfilia, which convey no age in particular, but suggest
somethingolderthaninfantus.
So while it might be prudent to disregard the majority ofdrownings, the following
casemeritsmorenotice:
A two-year-old girl was found drowned in the East ditch (ofYork). Maud, the nurse found her
andhascome. Nooneissuspected.Judgement, Misadventure."
While this case could not strictly be termed infanticide (the killing ofan infant one
year or less of age), it is noteworthy for two reasons. First, in light of Henry l's
statute then in force (making infanticide committed by someone other than aparent a
crime ofhomicide on par with that ofan adult homicide), it is logical that the nurse's
discovery ofthelittle girrs deathwas automatically suspectand warranted a coroner's
verdict. Second, the coroner here usedpuella, rather thanfilia orfemina, to describe
the girl. Theuseofthiswordcoupled withhertender agemay strengthenthedisregard
ofthemajorityofthedrowningsofvarioussonsanddaughtersrecordedhere.
More intriguing are the two other cases in the York rolls that mentionpueri, denot-
ingayoungmalechild,althoughperhapsnotaninfant:
Aboywas founddeadshut inachest in thefield ofBilbrough. Serlo ofBilbrough foundhimand
hasdied. Nooneissuspected.Judgment,Itisnotknownwhohewas."
A boywasfound dead inanearthn pot inapit. Amabel foundhimfirst, and thejurors say that
HerveyCrppesandAgneshiswifearesuspectedandthereforeletthembetaken."
The savagery of the above crimes might indicate infanticides carried out in secret
upon illegitimate infants. But nothing more is known regarding these deaths. The
paucity ofinformation recorded at the medievalinquest is mostfrustrating. What, for
example, was the relationship between Hervey and Agnes Crappes and the dead boy
found in the earthen pit, and why did thejurors suspect them? These few cases point
out the difficulty of obtaining reliable, factual accounts of secular prosecutions for
infanticide.
Ibid.,p.203.
"Ibid.,p.203.
" Ibid,. p.288.
" Ibid.,p.287.
" Ibid., p. 344.
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By the late thirteenth century, the Rolls ofthe Justices ofEyre (rather like circuit
courts) were revealing more details ofthe child murders. A review oftwo cases, one
from 1269 in Bedfordshire, the other from Buckinghamshire in 1363 illustrates the
broadenedfactualbase:
Ithappened intheparishofRavensden at Sturteslow on Sunday thefeast ofSt. Faith theVirgin
aboutthehourofnone[3p.m onSunday, October6, 1269]inthefifty-thirdyearthatJohn,sonof
Regnald ReeveofSturteslow,aninfantoneandahalfyearold,wentoutsideReginald'sdoorwhile
thelatterwasatdinner, andfell intoacertainditchandwasdrowned. Alice,hismother, searched
for him, to wit, her infant, and found him drowned. She produced pledges: Arnold Argent and
JohnYun,bothofRavensden.
Inquest was made before Simon Read, the coroner, by four neighbouring townships, Renhold,
Ravensden,Wilden,andGoldington; theysayasisaforesaid,andtheyknownothingelse."
It happened at Stone on Wednesday next after the feast of St. Augustine in the thirty-seventh
yearofKingEdwardtheThird[May 31, 13631 thatJohn Marstonfoundthedeadbodyofachild
called Joan, whose death was caused by the boiling water in a brass pot. His pledges are John
Moisant and Robert Morti[mer]. The four neighbours are Henry, Robert Fernelourgh junior,
WilliamGoodale,andHenryRussjunior; andtheyarepledgesforeachother.
Fourneighbouring townships, Stone, Stoke-Mandeville, Bishopston, andDinton, presentthaton
Friday next before Whit Sundaya certainpot full ofboilingwaterstoodon thehearth, one ofits
legs resting on a stone, and it fell from the stone and the boilingwater fell upon Joan, Nicholas
Ross's daughter, who was a little over half a year old, and thus she came to her death. The pot
wasworthtwoshillings.47
Here, finally, the ages ofthe infants are recorded; moreover, the inquest established
the accidental circumstances under which death took place. The two methods in
evidence here (drowning and scalding) are those which were mentioned frequently in
church law on infanticide. Yet, even simple negligence was not alleged. The two cases
above also demonstrate the secular parallel to ecclesiastical compurgation, that of
producing pledges. These pledges seemed to be a frequent defence employed in
secularprosecutionsofalltypes.
Another defence which seems to have been used when secular authorities took
jurisdiction over infanticide by a parent was insanity. Barbara Hannawalt, writing on
the female felon ofthe period, points out that the insanity defence was one unique to
infanticide:
Cases arising from insanity were among the few in which motivations were fully discussed.
Insanity wasafairly uncommon plea ingoldelivery, but ofthesecas, that ofamotherkilling
herchildren was the most usual. These unfortunate womenall had a history ofderangement, or
weresuicidal, orhadbeensickwithahighfever. Agnes,wife ofRoger Moyses, anexample ofthe
first type of cae, killed her young son, Adam, during one of her frequent bouts of insanity
(amentia). Emma, wife ofHenry Wolfrom ofCantele, also suffered a period of"demented and
vexed"behaviorbeforekillingherchild. Otherwomen,likeMatilda, widowofMarklcWaleysof
Buthamwell, tried to commit suicide beforeretumingandmurdering thechildren. Juliana Matta
ofKillingbury, however, was ill and became crzed from fever. In this state, she drowned her
"C harles Gross (ed.), Select casesfrom the Coroners' Rolls, A.D. 1265-1413, London, Benard
Quaritch, SeldenSociety, 1881,p. 13.
47Ibid., p. 39.
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one-year-oldsoninawell. Sadisticviolencemightalsoaccompanymurdersbytheinsaneasitdid
inthecase ofMargery, wifeofWilliamCalbot, whokilledhertwo-year-old daughterwithaknife
andforcedherfour-year-oldtositintheflamesofthehearth.The courtcases containinsufficient
informationaboutthemurderessestolabeltheirparticulartypeofmentalderangement."
The insanity defences employed here seem very liberal by the modem standards to be
reviewed; however, again most of the victims were over one year of age, and were
thus not really subjects ofinfanticide. This might explainthe secularjurisdiction. And
Hannawalt goes ontoreportthat"therewasonly onecase ofinfanticide[thekillingof
a child under a year old] in 2,933 homicides reported in gaol delivery and coroners'
rolls".49
A few other infanticides have been recorded in secular court records, and once
again,theinsanitypleawasreadilyacceptedandtheaccusedacquitted.50
Ofthe secularchild-killing cases looked athere, and in nearly all others reported to
secular authority that survived,"" the courts concluded death resulted from misad-
ventures oraccidents. Insanity andpledgeswerereadilyacceptedbythecourts, andno
criminal intent was found. Only in the case ofHervey and Agnes Crappes were sus-
pects bound over to receive the king's justice. And, strangely enough, none of the
cases involved suffocation by overlaying-the most prevalent method ofinfanticide.
Indeed, most ofthe cases discussed wereprobably not those ofinfanticide, but rather
the killing ofan older child. Perhaps the crime ofinfanticide by overlaying and other
means, which are so difficult to detect and for which intent is nearly impossible to
ascertain, waslefttothechurch.
Allthe aboveexamples ofchild-killingrepeatedly reinforce theideathattheinfant's
life was not equal to that of an adult or even a more fully developed child. While
ecclesiastical and secular courts called an infant's death homicide, in practice, it was
dealtwithassomethingquiteless.
EVOLUTION OF INFANTICIDE LAWS IN ENGLAND
Although the focus of this paper is the attitudes towards infanticide found in
medieval England, itisnecessarytoreview howthese attitudes, manifested inthelegal
system, persisted, and can be found in later English statutes. A briefreview ofthese
statutes willbeusefulintracingtheevolutionofmodemattitudestowardinfanticide.
Infanticide continued to occur as England emerged from the Middle Ages and
entered the glory of the Elizabethan age. While the church continued to wam its
parishioners againstthissin,duringthistimeitwasbeingtom asunderbyHenryVIIl's
splitfrom Rome and his founding ofthe Church ofEngland. The ecclesiastical chaos
was continued by his daughter Mary's attempt to reassert the power ofthe Church of
Rome. Finally, the ascension of Elizabeth I to the throne lastingly established the
ChurchofEngland, independentofthePope. Theseupheavals inthechurchmayhave
"BarbaraHannawalt, 'Thefemale felon infourteenthcenturyEngland', Viator, 1975,5:253-268,
pp. 260-261.
"Ibid., p. 259.
'oHurnard,op.cit.,note 1 above,pp. 161 and 163.
6See, e.g., Stenton op. cit., note 38 above, pp. 113 (no. 430), 193 (no. 464), 199 (no. 484), 219 (no
554),223(no.567),224(no. 568),235(no.602),237(no.610),242(no.629),247(no.652),250(no. 665),
254(no. 679),274(no. 735), 278 (no. 749), 289(no. 787), 376(no. 1039).
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caused secularcourts to assertmore and morecontrol overpublicsins such asinfanti-
cide. At this time, rapid urbanization was also occumng, and toleration ofthe secret
crime ofchild destruction became public revulsion at infants' bodies which could no
longer be so easily concealed or destroyed in the population-dense cities. At the same
time, society was re-examining treatment ofchildren in general; Thomas Phaire's The
boke ofchyldrun in 1544 introduced more humanitarian methods of child care and
paediatrics.
Court records from the Essex Sessions and Assize Records reveal that nearly thirty
infanticidesinthemiddleandlatesixteenthcenturywerebroughttosecularauthorities,
as well as a number of murders of more mature children.52 F. G. Emmison reports
that "[i]nfanticide was woefully common, and there wereprobably many otherdeaths
bysmotheringorbruisingwhichwereconcealedfromthecoroner".5f3
Ofthe thirty infanticides in the Essex rolls, Emmison notes that all but three ofthe
victimswere illegitimate."" This is further evidenceofthe stigmatization that attached
tofornicationandbastardyresultingfromsuchunions.
Areviewofsomeoftheseinfanticidesisilluminating:
One spinster, on 21 October 1570 between 12 and 1 a.m. at the house ofWilliam Fytche gentle-
man, hermaster, at Little Canfield (Hall), gave birth to adeadinfant inthebackhouseand threw
itintohishorsepond;noverdictgiven.
In the house ofJohn Perrye yeoman, her master, at Stanford-le-Hope, [a woman] secretly gave
birthatnight,afterwhichshecutthebaby'sthroatandthrewhimintoanearbystream,weighted
withstones;guilty.
A baby was born in Cludens Close in Copt Hall Park, Epping, and thrown into the "mud or
slud" ofthe ditch; not guilty, but John Stile did it. [John Stile is the John Doe, or Unknown of
theera.]
Aservant ofRichard HarteofSt. Mary's, Maldon, yeoman, boreadaughterwithoutamidwife's
aidandputhernakedintoachestinthebedroom. Nextdayshetooktheinfant,thendead,andby
theadvice ofhermaster, theputativefather, buried it inaheapofhorsedunginthegarden; "not
inprison" [refers, presumablytothemother].
Aninfant, born"withoutthehelpofanywoman",wasstrangled.
A widow stangled her newly-born infant; another widow was present and abetted her. The
motherwashanged, andtheabettoracquitted.
AwomanburiedheroffspringclosetothehouseofWilliamGreygentlemanatDanbury.
A servant ofHumphrey MoptedofFrintonyeomansecretlydeliveredherselfandthen"defaced"
the baby among her pigs; in the jurors' view it was born dead through her negligence in not
seekingamidwife'shelp."6
The methods used in the aboveexamples are nowfamiliar-asphyxiation by smoth-
ering or suffocating, drownings, strangulations and even more gruesome means such
" F. 0. E n, Elizabethan life:disorder(FromEssex Sessions andAssizeRecords),Chelmsford,
EssexCountyCouncil, 1970,pp. 155-156. "Ibid., p. 156.
"Ibid., p. 157.
" Ibid.,p. 157.
11Catherine Damme
ascuttingthethroatorstrikingtheheadonthebedpost."6
Itwasthefrequentkillings ofillegitimateinfantsthatledtonewlegislation underthe
Stuart kings. In 1623, an "Act to prevent the destroying and murdering of bastard
children" waspassed byparliamentwhichstated:
Whereas many lewd Women that have beendelivered ofBastard Children, to avoyd their shame
andtoescape punishment, doesecretliebury, orconceale theDeathoftheirChildren, andafterif
the child be found dead she said Women doe alleadge that the said Children were borne dead;
whereas it falleth out sometymes (although hardlie it is to be proved) that the said Child or
Children were murthered by the said Women their lewd Mothers, or by their assent or procure-
ment; For the preventing therefore ofthis great Mischiefe, be itenacted by theAuthoritieofthis
presentParliament, ThatifanyWomanafterone Monethnextensuingtheends ofthisSessionof
Parliament, be delivered of any issue of the Body, Male or Female, which being borne alive,
should by the Lawes of this Realm be a bastard, and that she endeavour privatlie either by
drowning or secrett burying thereof, or any other way, either by herselfe or the procuring of
others, soe to conceale the Death thereof, as that it may not come to light, whether it be borne
alive ornot, but beconcealed, in every such Case the Mother soe offending shall sufferDeath as
inthe Case ofMurtherexcept such Mothercanmakeproffeby oneWitnesseat theleast, that the
Child(whoseDeathwasbyhersoeintended tobeconcealed)wasbornedead.57
Inpassing this act, parliament wastakingcognizance ofthegreatperil to the lives of
illegitimate children to whichthe mores ofsociety had subjected them, and was equat-
ing their deaths with murder ofan adult. The law also reversed the common law pre-
sumption ofdead birth. Before passage ofthe act, in a court proceeding for alleged
infanticide, the prosecution had to rebut thepresumption that the infant was stillborn
(and therefore no crime had been committed). Under the 1623 statute, the accused in
such a proceeding would have to rebut the presumption that the child was born alive
(i.e., the law presumed a live birth, and thus presumed a crime had been committed
becausetheinfantwasfounddead).
TheOldBaileySessionsPapers(1688)giveanexampleofhowthisactworked:
Sinah Jones ofthe Parish ofSt. MaryWoolnoth, was Indicted for Murdering herBastard Male
Child, on the eighteenth December last, being Saturday night, by stopping its Breath with a
Cloath put in its Mouth; shebeing a Servant in the House ofMr. Cousins. The Evidenceagainst
herwasplain, theNurse, theChairwoman, theMidwife, theMasterand hisServant, alldeposing
thatshe, denyingthekey,theybroke openherTrunk, wheretheyall sawtheChildDeadwrapped
up ina Cloath, with a Rag inthe Mouth ofit, asbig as aHandkerchief, and that theChild being
something Warm, they tried all they could to recover Life init, but to no purpose. The Prisoner
saidlittleforherself, butthatsheknew,nothingoftheCloathintheMouthoftheChild, andthat she
had notherSenses, andwasLight-headed. ThentheStatutewasread toher,wherein, iftheChild
be found Dead and Concealed, though it were so Born, the Person Conealing it, shall suffer
Death as in case of Murder, except she can prove by one Witness at least that the Child so
ConcealedwasbornDead. Uponfullevidence, shewasbroughtinguiltyofMurder."
Sinahreceived the death sentence. But what oftheprosecution for infanticide when
thechildwasborn inwedlock?
e Ibid.,p. 157.
' 21 Jac. I., c27 in D. Seaborne Davies, 'Child killing in English law',Modern Law Rev., 1937, 1:
203-217, p.213.
SJ. W. Jeudwine, Observations on English criminal law and Procedure, London, P. S. King, 1968,
pp. 126-127.
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Intheyear 1668atAyksbury amarriedwomanofgoodreputation beingdelivered ofachildand
nothavingsleptmanynights fellintoatemporaryphrenzy,andkildherinfantintheabsenceofany
company; butcompany comingin, shetold them, that shehad kiled herinfant, and thereit lay;
she was brought to gaol presently, and after some sleep she recovered her understanding, but
marvelledhoworwhyshecamethither; shewasindicted formurder,anduponhertrialthewhole
matter appearing it wasleft to thejury with this direction, that ifit did appear that she had any
useofreasonwhen shedidit, they weretofindherguilty; but iftheyfoundherunderaphrenzy,
tho by reason ofher late delivery and want ofsleep, they should acquit her; that had there been
anyoccasion tomoveher to thisfact, asto hidhershame, which is ordinarilythe case ofsuchas
aredelivered ofbastardchldren and destroy them; orifthere had beenjealousyinherhusband,
that the child had been none ofhis, or ifshe hid the infant, or denied the fact, these had been
evidences, that the phrenzy was counterfeit; but noneof these appearing, and the honesty and
virtuous deportment ofthewomaninherhealthbeingknowntothejury,andmanycircumstance
ofinsanity appearing, thejury found her not guilty to the satisfactionofallthatheardit.,,
Here, society's stigmatization provided a motive to a servant-girl mother to kill her
bastard child, but a mother "of good reputation" who killed her legitimate infant
appearedtohavenomotiveandconsequentlymustbeinsane(and could beacquitted).
Thus, the insanity plea of a respectable matron of Aylesbury was readily accepted
whilethatofpoorSinahJoneswassummarilyrejected.
J. W. Jeudwine, commenting onthese cases and others, statesthat"[w]hatprobably
saved [these women]-in the cases in which they were saved-was the increasing re-
luctance ofjuries to convict for murder in such cases [;] [t]hey would grasp at any
suggestion thatthe baby had been stillborn, or had died in the course ofbirth, orhad
beenaccidentallykilled".60
The requirement under the 1623 Act that the accused prove the baby was stillborn
was an emormous burden ofproofto sustain, and it is not surprising that the statute
was repealed in 1803 and replaced by Lord Ellenborough's Act which reinstated the
common law presumption of dead (still)birth. That act also provided that women
indicted for such offences would be treated under the laws and rules of evidence
governing murder indictments except that if the accused were acquitted of murder,
thejury could find an alternative verdict oftwoyears' imprisonment iftheillegitimate
infant'sdeathhadbeenconcealed.61Additionally, the 1803 actalsomadetheadminis-
trationofsubstancestobringonamiscarriage anoffence. '
Thelawwasextended in 1828 tocovermothersofallinfants, whetherillegitimate or
not." The main thrust of the statute was against concealment; moreover, the act
provided that "it shall not be necessary to prove whether the child diedbefore, at, or
afterbirth"."
There was great reluctance, however, on the part ofjuries to consider infanticide/
concealments as murders. The last execution for infanticide was in 1849. The verdict
was delivered on one Rebecca Smithwho, the evidence showed, deliberately poisoned
her infant and had probably disposed ofother children similarly."" Even though the
6Ibid.,p. 127.
"Ibid.,p. 127.
Davies,op.cit.,note57above,p.215.
"Ibid.,p.215;Jeudwine,op.cit.,note 58above,p. 127.
"Davies, op.cit.,note 57above,p.215.
"Ibid.,p.215.
'Jeudwine, op.cit.,note 58above, p. 128.
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jury found Smith guilty, itdisliked the legal connotation ofmurderandrecommended
mercy. For the law required that the indictment be brought for murder, not a lesser
offence. This dilemma (the inability to indict on a lesser charge) brought about a
change in the law in 1861 (The Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, s.60) to make
concealment ofa birth a separate substantive crime which applied to any person, not
justthemother."6
The reluctance, even refusal, ofthe Crown to seek the death penalty for infanticide
wasinstitutionalized when,in 1864,itbecame thepracticeoftheprosecutor(the Home
Office) "to advise the commutation ofthedeathpenaltywhenawomanwasconvicted
ofmurdering her own child while it was under or not much over the age of twelve
months".67
Agreatpartofthissentimenttowardleniency tothemotherwasbasedonthealmost
visceral "feeling" that such a crime simply could not be a rational act, although this
feelingwasnotoften articulated. ButonecommentatorbeforetheCapitalPunishment
Commission didstate:
... womeninthatconditiondogetthestrogestsymptomsofwhatamountsalmosttotemporary
madness, and... oftenhardly knowwhattheyareabout, andwill do things whichtheyhaveno
settled ordeliberateintention whateverofdoing .... [YJoucannot estimate theloss to the child
itself, you know nothing about it at all. With regard to the public it causes no alarm, because
it is a crimewhichcanbecommittedonlybymothersupontheirnewlybornchildren."
Jeudwine also recounts the feeling of Justice Bramwell who tried a woman for
infanticide:
Another case which I raemmber was one of the most painfl cases that I ever tried. A young
women had anillegtimate child ayearold: shewasveryfondofitand behaved well to it. What
particular thing so disturbed herI do not know, but I have somereason to suppose that she was
about to be married and that a person had threatened to inform her intended husband that his
brother was the father ofthe chfld.... On a Sunday morning the child's clothes were hanging
beforethefiretodryand shewasevidently intending todressitandtakeit outanduseitwell, as
she had always done. Shecut its throat, and shenrshed out into the street and said that shehad
done so.... I canot in my own mind believe that that woman was as mad as the law would
require her to be . . . but it was an act ofsuch a charcter that the only address to thejury was
"'Thiswomanmayhavehadasuddenconditionofmindcomeuponher,inwhichshereallydidnot
know what she was doing." She ws a very decent looking young woman; everybody in the
courtwept, thecounsel onbothsidesandthejuryandeverybody; andtheresultwasthatshewas
acquitted."
Itseems,fromthecaseabove,thenormalrulesofevidenceand otherlegalnicetieswere
cast away during an infanticide trial. Emotional reaction, not the rule of law, was
paramount, and the minds ofjury andjurist could not accept that such a heinous act
could be committed by a rational person-the accused's mind had to be deranged, if
onlytemporarily.
What is unique in the insanity defence for infanticide is its radical departure from
"Davies,op.cit.,note57above,p.216.
7 Jeudwine, op.cit.,note58above,p. 128.
'l Ibd.,p. 128.
" Ibid.,pp. 128-129.
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the normal criminal insanity defence-the McNaughten Rules of 1843.70 To plead
insanity under the McNaughten rules, the following questions had to be posed: (1)
Did the accused know the nature and quality ofhis act? Ifnot, insanity is a defence.
(2) Ifthe accused did know the nature and quality ofhis act, did he know that it-was
morallyand/orlegallywrong?Ifnot,insanityisadefence.71
The McNaughten rules applied throughout England and in nearly one-third of
United States' jurisdictions.7' But McNaughten makes an insanity defence very
difficult to prove. Indeed, the standards set by the McNaughten case could not have
beenmetbyanyofthewomenacquittedofchild-killingbecause oftemporaryinsanity.
Yet these legally untenable insanity pleas were accepted, even solicited, in the case of
infanticide byjuries and courts and thus stand as a further proofofthe special status
affordedoneaccusedofinfanticide.
Englishinfanticidelawsweresubjected tomanyparliamentary attempts atreform in
1872, 1874and 1880. These attempts mayhave been aconsequence ofthe deep-seated
ambivalence toward the crime: (A) Itwas homicide under the law, but nojury would
convictunder thoselaws and (B) ifitwasalessercrimethanhomicide, noonewanted
to admitit, muchlesswrite thisviewinto law. Thejurists and Members ofParliament
found refuge in pinning guilt on the woman's psyche and endocrine system at post-
partum; temporary insanity was a convenient loophole. Thus, one finds proposed
statutes referencing women as "deprived of their ordinary powers of self-control"
(1872),73 or "deprived ofthe power ofself-control by any disease or state ofmind or
bodyproducedbybearingthechildwhosedeathiscaused."(1874).7'
The objective ofthese attempted statutory revisions was to restore to thejudge the
discretion ofreducingthechargefrommurderto manslaughter andtoopen thewayto
aninsanitydefence.
Finally, in 1922, an Infanticide Bill was passed which allowed a jury to deliver a
verdict of murder or manslaughter, without direction from the judge. A judge was
permitted to sentence the convicted manslaughterer to anything from life imprison-
mentto afine orconditionaldischarge.75 As to layingthegroundworkfor an insanity
plea,thewordingwasthus:
Where a womanunlawfully by any direct means intentionally causes the death ofhernewlyborn
child, but at thetime ... hadnotfullyrecoveredfromtheeffect ofgivingbirth tosuchchild, and
byreasonthereofthebalanceofhermindwasdisturbed ....
Jeudwineputsthislegislatively-bornedefenceintoperspective:
he [the drfter of the Bill felt the need to draft the clause in such a way that it would be self-
justifying-in other words, that the reasonforaccording special treatment to this class ofhomi-
cidewouldbeevident. Hencehisreferencetothemother'sstateofmind.77
"GlanvilleWilliams,CriminalLaw,2nded.,Ldndon,Stevens, 1961,ch. 10.
Ibid.,p.442. "For the most recent insanity rules in U.S. jurisdictions, see U.S. v. Brawner, 471 F. 2d 969
(D.C.Cir. 1972).
" Jeudwine, op.cit.,note58above,p. 129.
"Ibid.,p. 129.
"Ibid.,p. 131.
"Ibid.p. 131., "7Ibid.,p. 131.
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And, having to prove that the balance of the accused's mind was disturbed was a
much less onerous burden ofproofto sustain than trying to show that she had been
"deprived of her ordinary self-control" (the 1872 revision) ordid notknowthenature
andqualityofheract(theMcNaughtenDefence).
The last problem ofthe Infanticide Act was the ambiguity as to how old a "newly
born" child was. When, in 1927, a woman was tried and convicted for murder rather
than infanticide because the victim was thirty-five days old and not "newly born",
parLament realized clarification was imperative.78 This quantitative defect was cor-
rectedintheInfanticideAct of1938 by inclusion ofallinfantsundertwelvemonths of
ageassubjects ofinfanticide.7'
Although prison sentences were mandated by the modern infanticide laws, the
following table shows a shift from impositions ofpenal time to probation (often with
psychiatrictreatmentorcommitmenttoapsychiatricinstitution).
TABU 1 (")
Women FoundGuilty of infanticide inGreatBritain
And How CourtsDealt WithThem
Years Recognisances Probation Imprisonment Othera Total
ordischarge (=100,)
1923-27 42.4% 5.1% 49.1%b 3.4% 59
1928-32 34.4% 18.1% 42.6%c 4.9% 61
1933-38 44.0% 22.7% 33.3% Nil 66
1939-45 No statistics published
1946-50 24.4% 49.0% 22.3% 4.3% 139
1951-55 15.0% 55.0% 16.2% 13.8% 80
1956-60 9.5% 76.2% 3.2% 11.1% 88
1961-65 5.0% 68.1% 1.3%d 25.0% 72
a Most ofthese cases were no doubt committed toinstitutions formental defectives or morerecently
to mental hospital. In 1964and 1965 thepublished statistics made it clearthat all women not dealt
withbydischarge, probation, orimprisonmentweredealtwithbyhospitalorders.
b In 1923 one of these women was sentenced to 4 years penal servitude another 3 years penal
servitude.
c Oneofthesewomenwassenttoaborstal.
d Shewassent toprisonfor6monthsorless.
The table shows an incredible abandomnent ofprison sentences as a deterrent to or
punishment for the taking of a human life. Parallels to medieval penalties (or lack
thereof)forinfanticide become quite clear and illustrate society's consistent treatment
oftheinfant's lifeaslessthanthatofanadultunderlaw.
'" Thewomanwasimmediatelyreprieved, ibid.,p. 132.
79 Ibid.,p. 132.
SO Ibid., p. 133.
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THE INFANT'S LIFE IN AMERICAN LAW
LawintheUnited Statesdoesnotexhibitthesamepreoccupationwithinfanticideas
does English law; in fact, no distinction between homicide and infanticide is made in
America. The basic reason for this difference in emphasis lies in the cultural and his-
toricalroots oftheU.S. legalsystem.
Asacolony ofEngland, theUnited Stateswasadministered underEnglishstatutory
and common law. After independence, the states adopted the English common law
which existed before independence and which then assured continuity ofprecedent in
judicialprocedures. TheUnited Stateshadno medievalexperiencetodrawuponother
thanthatofEngland. Moreover, thecolonies thatunitedtoformanationdidnothave
an established church with jurisdiction overpublic sin. Atthe timetheEnglishjurists
were carving out a distinction for infanticide in law (1803), America hadjust begun
developingitsownlegalsystemwithinthetraditionsofitsinheritedcommonlaw.
It is easier to ascertain English attitudes toward infanticide because nearly all
statutes are national in scope-i.e., they pertain to the whole ofthe United Kingdom.
Thus, allthe provincialgovernments have oneuniformhomicide law and one body of
lawrelatingtotheinfant.
However, the United States adopted a federalist system, reserving for the states all
thoserightsandpowers notspecificallydelegatedtothefederalgovernmentintheU.S.
Constitution. Each state, then, developed its own body oflaw (and precedentflowing
therefrom) but, ofcourse, within the constricts ofthe Constitution. Therefore, each
state has its own penal code and homicide statutes; there is no national homicide law.
America's legalhistory ofinfanticidehasthusbeentruncatedbyitscolonial status and
fragmented by its federal system. No laws proscribing infanticide exist, no legislative
battles as to its status have ever been waged in the U.S. Congress as they were in the
British Parliament, and the crime is wholly under the aegis ofstate homicide statutes.
However, some vestiges ofthe medieval society's lack ofregard for the infant's life
can be discovered in American law. The state can legitimately protect the health and
welfare of infants, and it exercises this power in many ways including determining
custody and guardianship ofchildren and prosecuting parents for child abuse. How-
ever, my review here will be limited to legalimplications ofcertain activities in which
parents (and other persons) have life and death power over infants or potential in-
fants: (1) abortion, (2) proxy consent to medical treatment, and (3) euthanasia of
defectivenewborns.
Under what law or legal theory can the state protect the infant? Awell-established
duty ofthe state toitscitizens is theprotection oftheirhealth, safety andwelfare. This
duty imparts a power (commonly called the "police power") to the state by which it
canachieveprotectionofinfants'(and allcitizens')lives.Thepolicepowertoprotectis
notunbridled; theparameters ofitare delineated by statute, bythe U.S. Constitution,
and byjudicial decisions. Nor are the parameters static, but rather are adynamic pro-
cessalwaysinfluxinresponseto asociety'svalues.
Acrucialconstitutionalrestrictionuponthestate'spoweristhebodyofrightsgrant-
ed to individual citizens andguaranteed within the U.S. Constitution. Thus, an action
taken by the state to protect an infant may run counter to an individual's freedoms.
Courts must then decide which value should prevail: the state's interest in its citizens
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ortheindividual's righttobefreeofstateinterferenceorcontrol.
In balancing the individual's claim ofunconstitutional restriction of his freedoms
against the state's need to protect the public health and safety, the courts have deve-
loped a number of criteria to be met in the legitimization of a proposed action or
statute. To determine the proper balance ofrights versus interests, the courts usually
apply a "minimum scrutiny" test for determining the constitutionality of various
state actions. In a "minimal scrutiny" test, the court looks at a state statute or action
with a strong presumption that it is valid. With this presumption, the court will not
disturb state activities unless they blatantly lack a reasonable relationship to a legiti-
mate state interest or unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or overbroad for their
purpose.
However, this discussion must centre on the state's interest in the lives of infants
both in rerum natura and in utero. Because such interests may collide with certain
constitutional rights ofparents (privacy rights orfreedom to practise religion), a more
rigorousjudicialtest-thatof"strictscrutiny,"-mustbeanalysed.
Courts have termed a "strict scrutiny" test one which is applied when fundamental
rightsprotectedintheBillofRights(suchasthoseofassembly, movement, religion, or
privacy in sexual or procreational activities) have been involved or when a suspect
classification (race, alienage, ethnicity)hasresulted.81 Thestrictscrutiny test(also call-
edthe"compelling stateinterest" test) differsfromthat ofminimal scrutiny inthatthe
stateactionchallenged mustnotmerely berationally related to the accomplishment of
a legitimate state interest; rather, it must be necessary to the accomplishment of a
compelling stateinterestand mustemploytheleastrestrictive means to achieve its end.
There are many cases in which the compelling state interest argument has been
pivotal,82 but it was not until 1965 that the Supreme Court established the constitu-
tionally protected right of privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut,83 the U.S. Supreme
Courtstruckdown aConnecticut statutethatprohibitedtheuseofcontraceptives, and
in doing so prohibited the state from interfering with the privacy surrounding the
"intimate relation ofhusband and wife and theirphysician's role in one aspect ofthat
relation".8' Once the privacy zone around the marital relationship was established, it
was expanded in a 1972 case. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,8" the high court, applying the
equal protection clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, extended Griswold to include
therightofsinglepersons tousecontraceptives.86
"I See, e.g., Loving v.Vira, 388 U.S.1. 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010(1967)"suspectclassifi-
cation" by race; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1971)
"suspect classification" ofaliens; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 745 S. Ct. 667, 68 L. Ed. 866
(1954) "suspect classification"bynationalorigin.
'" See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1964);
Sherbertv.Vemer, 374U.S. 398(1963).
Griswoldv.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479(1965).
I4bid., p. 484
"Eisenstadt v.Baird,405 U.S. 438(1972).
"Ibid., p. 453. Justice Brennan said: "If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to
married persons cannot beprohibited, a ban on distributions to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible ... Ifthe right ofprivacy means anything, it is the right ofthe individual, married or
single, to be freefromunwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
personasthedecisionwhethertobearorbegetachild."
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GriswoldandEisenstadtlaidthelegalgroundworkforthedecisionon thepersonhood
ofthe foetus under law. In 1973, the issue ofabortion was confronted bythe Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade.87 The court ruled that the zone of privacy was found to be
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy".88 The court thus established the zone ofprivacy around the woman and
herphysician. Duringthefirsttrimesterthedecisionto abortwouldliewithinthiszone
and could not be disturbed by the state.89 But, after the first trimester, "the state ...
may ifit chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related
tomaternalhealth."90Afterviability, "thestate .. .may,ifitchooses,regulateandeven
proscribe, abortionexcept...forthepreservationofthelifeorhealthofthemother."91
Here is the leadingjurisprudential articulation ofwhen the infant in utero reaches
thatlevel ofmaturitywhichjustifies stateinterventiondespite theconstitutionalrights
ofthe mother. However, even atviability, the mother's life and health are paramount
to thestate's interestinprotection ofthelifeoftheviablefoetuswho is onlyapotential
person.9"
Roe did not signal a retreat from state protection of the foetus as a person, but
rather, reaffirmed the pre-eminent status of the woman and the lesser (indeed non-)
status ofthefoetus. ForbeforeRoe, the status ofthefoetus as apersonunderlaw was
not clearly defined in- the state statutes proscribing abortion (which were invalidated
by Roe). These statutes, although occasionally purporting to protect the foetus and
future infant, in fact protected the mother. The myth ofthe blameless mother which
evolved inmedieval England waspresent in theseAmerican state statutes on abortion.
Forexample, under most ofthe state laws, thewomanwas considered tobethe victim
ofthe abortionist and not the perpetrator ofthe crime.93 Women were seldom prose-
cuted forseeking and obtaining anillegal abortion. Usually, the pregnantwoman was
not even thought to be an accomplice," notwithstanding the fact that she willingly
submittedtoanabortion.9'
The court in Roe brought out the hypocrisy of the appellee's argument that the
Texasabortionstatutewasnecessarytoprotectthepersonofthefoetus:
WhenTexas argues that a fetus isentitded to Fourteenth Amendment protection as a person, it
facesadilemma.
Neither inTexasnor inanyother State areallabortions prohibited. Despitebroad proscription,
an exception always exists. (Saving the mohe's life is a typical exception). But if a fetus is a
personwhoisnot tobedeprivedoflifewithout dueprooess oflaw, andifthemother'scondition
isthesoledetrminant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out oflinewith the Amend-
ment'scommand?
6?RoeV. Wade,410U.S. 113(1973). "Ibid.,p. 153.
"Ibid.,p. 163.
"Ibid.,p. 163.
*1Ibid.,pp. 164-165.
"Ibid.,p. 154.
u1 C.J.S.Abortion 14(1936) note48.
"Ibid., note49.
"Ibid.,note S0. Afewcourtshaveheldthatamotherisaparticipantandlegallyresponsibleforher
act of submission. On rare occasions she was prosecuted as a principal in the crime, or for self-
induced abortion. In certain states there was statutory punishment forthe woman who caused a self-
abortionorwhosubmittedherbodyforone.See,generally, 1 C.J.S.Abortion14,notes51,52,52.5,47.
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There are other inconsistencies between Fourteenth Amendment status and the typical abortion
statute. It has already been pointed out ... that in Texas a woman is not a principal or an
accomplice with respect to an abortion upon her. Ifa fetus is a person, why is the woman not a
pincipal oraccomplice? Further, thepenalty forcriminal abortion (in Texas and most states) is
signifantly less than the maximum penalty for murder.... If the fetus is a person, may the
penaltiesbedifferent?"
Thus, the Courtacknowledged thatafoetus cannot merittheprotection ofthe stateas
a person. Such a position echoes the medievalist's view ofthe infant's lesser status in
Roev. Wade, andthestateabortionstatutesitstruckdown.
Yettheinterestinlifeoftheinfantinrerumnaturahasbeenupheld overtherights of
the parents in other areas ofthe law. In medical treatment ofminors, the infant can
invokethestate'sprotectionagainstparentalwisheswhicharelife-threatening.
Under law, parents have a primary interest in the upbringing of the children.
However, the state retains an overriding interest (as parens patriae) in the health,
safety and welfare ofthe child. Ordinarily, medical treatment to an infant is adminis-
tered only after informed consent has been obtained from the infant's parent or
guardian. Atcommonlaw,minorswereconsideredincapableofgivingvalidconsent."7
Recognized exceptions are medical emergencies where treatment must be rendered
immediately and statutory provisions which authorize a minor's consent to therapy
under certain circumstances, such as venereal disease.'8 Proxy consent ofparents for
performance of surgery on a child is not often challenged because the procedure is
usuallyforthechild'sbenefit."
" Roev.Wade,op.cit.,note87above,p. 157,note54.
"7 Seee.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126F. 2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. &C. 309
(1932).
" E.g., 35.03, Texas Family Code (1975): Ch. 35; 35.03. Consent to Treatment by Minor: (a) A
minor may consent to the furishing of hospital, medical, surgical, and dental care by a licensed
physician or dentist ifthe minor: (1) ison activedutywiththearmedservicesoftheUnited Statesof
America; (2) is 16 years ofage or older and resides separate and apart from his parents, managing
conservator, or guardian, whether with orwithouttheconsent oftheparents, managing conservator,
or gurdian and regardiess of the duration of such residence, and is managin his own financial
affairs, regardless of the source of the income; (3) consents to the diagnosis and treatment of any
infectious, contagious, or communicable disease which is required bylaw or regulation adopted pur-
suanttolawtobereportedbythelicensedphysicianordentisttoalocalhealthofficer;(4)isunmarried
andpregnant, andconsentstohospital,medical, orsurgicaltreatment, otherthan abortion, related to
her pregcy; (5) is 18 years of age or older and consents to the donation of his blood and the
penetration oftissuenecesary toaccomplish thedonation; or(6) consents toexamination and treat-
ment for drug addiction, drug dependency, or any other condition directly related to drug use.
(b) Consent by a minor to hospital, medical, surgical, or dental treatment under this section is not
subject to disaflirmance because ofminority. (c) Consent of the parents, managing conservator, or
guardian ofa minor is not necesary in order to authorize hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care
underthis section. (d)Alicensed physicianordentistmay,withorwithout theconsentofaminorwho
is apatient,advisetheparents, managing conservator, orguardian oftheminorofthetreatment given
toorneededbythe minor. (e)Aphysician or dentist licensed topractice medicineordentistry in this
state orahospital ormedical facility shall not be liablefor theexaminationand treatment ofminors
under this section except for his or its own acts ofnegligence. (f) A physician, dentist, hospital, or
medical facility may rely on the written statement ofthe minor containing the grounds on which the
minorhascapacitytoconsent tohisownmedicaltreatmentunderthissection.
" Whensuch abenefit to thechildhas beeninquestion, however, physicians havesought guidance
from the courts. In 1957, the Massachusetts Superior Court reviewed parental consent to kidney
transplant surgery between twin sons aged nineteen, one of whom was suffering from glomerulo-
nephritis. Thesurgeonspetitioned thecourttoruleontheadequacyoftheparents' consenttoremoval
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It is when an infant is in need ofsome medical procedure and the parents refuse to
consent, that the courts are most often called upon to assert the state's interest in the
infant's life. Decisions authorizing state intervention are often based on the courts'
interpretation ofchild neglect statutes which results in a finding ofneglect or depen-
dency. In addition, courts balance the parents' fundamental freedom ofreligion and
rights ofprivacy protected by the Constitution against the state's compelling interest
inthepreservationofthelivesofitscitizens.
The situation is clearly drawn when the medical treatment is needed immediately
and is onewhich has a highsuccess ratewith an accompanying lowrisk. Suchwasthe
case inPeopleexrel. Wallace v. Labrenz,lW0 wherein aninfantsufferingfrom erythro-
blastosis fetalis was given a blood transfusion under authority ofa court-appointed
guardian. The parents had refused to consent to a transfusion because such a proce-
dure violated their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the lower court's action, and, citing Prince v.
Massachusetts,0l1 stated "neitherrights ofreligion orrights ofparenthoodare beyond
ltation ....The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose
the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ir health or
death. ..".102 Nearly all jurisdictions have uniformly held that parents' religious
objections to blood transfusions can be overruled by the state when the procedure is
necessary tosavethelifeofan infant.""
The courts have even ordered such transfusions in the case ofan adult with minor
children who refused ablood transfusion.104 However, where minorchildren were not
involved, some courts have not interfered with an adult's refusal to allow a needed
blood transfusion."" Moreover, where the life of the infant is so inextricably inter-
twined with that of the adult, the court will again order a transfusion to a patient
oftheJehovah'sWitnessfaith. InRaleighFitkin-PaulMorganMemorialHospital, etc.
ofa kidney from the healthy twin. Where was the benefit? In finding the parents' consent sufficient,
thecourtlookedtopsychiatrictestimony tofindanemotional"benefit" inbeingadonoraswellasan
emotional detrint if the transplant were prohibited and the other twin died. In addition to the
psychological considerations, the court also based its decision on the ability ofthe healthy nineteen-
year-old tocomprehend thenature andrisks ofthesurgery. Two othercasesinvolvingfourteen-year-
olds were decided on similar grounds. See Masden v. Harrison, no. 68651 Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
12 June, 1957; Husky v. Harrison, no. 68666 Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., 30 August, 1957; Foster v.
Harrison, no. 68674 Eq., Mass. Sup Jud. Ct., 20 November, 1957; but see, Strunk v. Stunk, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Mich. 1975) where the
courtsdealwiththeissueofproxyconsenttokidneytransplantsurgeryinvolvingincompetentdonors.
1"Ppk exrel.Wallacev. Labrenz, 411 I.618,104 N. W. 2d 769(1952),cert. den'd., 344U.S. 824
(1952).
101 Princev.Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158(1944); seealse Peoplev.Pierson, 176N.Y. 201,68 N.E.
243 (2903).
Princev.Massachusetts, ibid.,p. 166. 1" Peopleecxrel.Wallacev. Labrenz, op.cit.,note 100above; Statev.Perricone, 181 A.2d751 (N.J.
1962); Wingard Petition, 7 Pa. D.&C.2d 522 (Co. Ct. 1956); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo.
1952); Hoener v. Bertinato, 171 A. 2d 140 (NJ. Sup. 1961); In re Santos, 227 N.Y.S. 2d 450, app.
dissm'd., 232N.Y.S. 2d621 (1965).
1" See, e.g., Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C.Cir. 1964),re-hearingden'd., 331 F. 2d 1010(D.C.Cir. 1964), cert.den'd., 377U.S. 978(1964).
111 See e.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32I11.2d 361, 205. N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Misc. 2d27,252N.Y.S.2d705(1962).
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v. Anderson,10 thecourt orderedatransfusion to apregnantwoman attermby clearly
basing its decision on saving the life ofan infant (represented by the viable foetus) in
which it said the state had a vital interest. Here, the infant's interest in life appears
equal ifnot superior to that ofan adult; however, we should note tbat the court in
Raleigh was not faced with a choice between the mother's life and that ofher child.
Rather, there were strong policy reasons for saving the mother's life against her will.
Amuch more difficult question is presented when the child's life is in no immediate
danger and when the state's intrusion conflicts with the parents' religious beliefs.107
These issues are less clear because then courts are asked to rule on procedures which
will affect the quality of life and not life itself. But whatever the fact situations, in
everycasethecourts mustweightherights oftheindividualtobe leftalone, topractise
his religion, to raise his children, or even to die, against the interests ofthe state in
protectingandpreservingthelivesofitscitizens.
However, legalimplications ofabortion and parentalproxyconsent areancillary to
the issue ofinfanticide in the United States. There is no special law or statute in any
state setting forthpenalties for killing an infant ofless than twelve months. Any such
acts are considered under state homicide statutes. It is interesting to note, however,
that almost no prosecutions for infanticide exist. Those that have been reported
usually involve a person otherthan the mother. One such casewasMorgon v. State,108
wherein a newly born illegitimate infant was found dead in a stream. The putative
father admitted to being brutal to the mother which caused a miscarriage, and, he
alleged, a stillbirth. Ofthe three physicians who examined the body, two declined an
opinion, and the third stated that the infant had been born alive. Additional medical
testimony showed that the infant's lungs had air in them. However, the father's
conviction ofsecond degree murderwas reversed on appealbecause, in the opinion of
the court, there was not enough evidence that the victim had been born alive to sus-
tain a conviction. And in order to convict ofmurder, the court said, the infant must
have"becomeareasona-blecreatureinbeing."'0'
This case points out a reluctance to convict a putative father of infanticide even
with fairly strong medical testimony indicating a live birth. Such an outcome is very
reminiscentoftheEnglish casesreviewedhere.
What is even more convincing of the special status granted infanticide in this
countryis notthe fewcases that arereported butrather, thedearth, indeed the almost
totalabsence, ofsuchprosecutions atall.
InmedievalEngland,parents oftenhadthepoweroflife anddeathovertheirinfants.
Today, aremnantofsuchpowersurvivesinAmericandecisionsregardingtreatmentof
defectivenewborns.Althoughithasnotbeenwidelydiscussedin themedicalliterature,
many obstetricians admit todeliveringinfants so severely deformedthattheyhave not
takenmeasures(often evenordinarymeasures) tosustaintheinfant'slife,preferringto
1W Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital etc. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
(1964), cert.den'd., 377U.S. 985(1964).
107 See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518 (N.J. 1974). In re Sampson, 317
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff., 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1971), aff. per curtam, 328 N.Y.S.2d 687(1972); In re
Green, 292A. 2d387(Pa. 1972), 307A.2d279(Pa. 1973).
8Morgonv. State,256S.W.433(Tenn. 1923).
Ibid., p.434.
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letlifeexpireinthedeliveryroom. Asmedicaltechnologyhasadvanced, theabilityand
opportunity to sustain life in such infants has presented serious ethical questions. No
legal actions have ever been taken in regard to these delivery room deaths. What is
noteworthy isthatthelife and deathdecisions aremadewithoutbenefitofdueprocess
oflaw or even any institutionalized guidelines from ahospital orprofessional associa-
tion. Rather, these decisions are made quickly in a delivery room within a short time-
span. Society implicitly trusts the physician's judgment as to the prognosis for the
infant.
Ifthe physician chooses to place a deformed infant in a special-care or intensive-
care nursery, the decision oflife or death is shifted from physician (in the emergency
context of the delivery room) to the parents. Then the decision becomes whether to
withdraw medical treatment and allow a seriously deformed infant to die. One such
situation was poignantly described by Dr. Raymond S. Duff and Dr. A. G. M.
CampbellatYale-NewHavenHospital:
[Al childhad had chronic pulmonarydisease afterpositive-pressureventilationwithhigh oxygen
concentrations fortreatmentofsevereidiopathicrespiratory-distress syndrome.Byfivemonthsof
age, hestillrequired40percent oxygentosurvive, andeventhen,hewaschronicallydyspneicand
cyanotic. He also suffered from cor pulmonale, which was difficult to control with digoxin and
diuretics. The nurses, parents and physicians considered it cruel to continue and yet difficult to
stop. All wereattached to thischild, whose life they had tried sohard tomake worth-while. The
family had endured high expenses (the hospital bill exceeding $15,000), and the strains of the
illness were believed to be threatening the marriage bonds and to .be causing sibling behavioral
disturbances. Oxygen supplementation was stopped, and the child died in about three hours.
Thefamilysettleddownandin 18monthshadanotherbaby,whowashealthy." 1
The parents, here, chose death for their infant without fear oflegal liability.11' The
propriety ofparental proxy consent to death was not questioned. The state has never
definitively stepped in to control this decision or uphold the infant's right to life,
however deformed or retarded that life may be. Are infants special? Would the state
have interfered if the parents had attempted to make such a decision for an adult
relative oramorefullymaturedinfant?
The answer can be found in the case ofIn thematter ofKaren Quinlan.12 There the
plaintiff-parents sought to withdraw Karen (then comatose and in a vegetative state)
from life-sustaining medical care. Although such decisions areroutinely, yetpainfully,
made by parents ofdefective newborns without stateinterference, forKaren, anadult,
the state did intervene to protect her interests in life. Although the Supreme Court of
New Jersey ultimately ruled to restore the decision-making power to Karen's parents
(inconsultation withherphysicians), what is importantis thatthe state feltcompelled
to intervene to protect Karen. Situations similar to Quinlan's arise frequently in the
special-carenurseriesinpaediatrichospitals, yetthestatedoesnotassertaninterest.
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the infant does indeed have lesser
111RaymondDuffandA.G.M.Campbell,"Moralandethical dilemmasinthespecialcarenursery",
NewEngl. J.Med., 1973,289:890-894, pp. 891-892.
111 But see, Marine Medical Center et al. v. Houle, No. 74-145 Civ., Maine Sup. Ct., 14 February,
1974.
11 In re Quinlan, 137 N. J. Super. 227, 348 A. 2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd., 70 N.J.10, 355
A.2d 647 (1976).
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status in law than the adult. Such status does not represent an erosion ofethical or
religious values nor is itevidence ofabrutal society, butratherdemonstrates society's
continued ambivalence toward the inherent sanctity of life and realistic judgment on
thequality oflife.
SUMMARY
Medieval values andcustoms relatingto the relative worth ofthe neonate underlaw
have been examined here in some depth. This examination has illustrated the lower
status inwhichthe infantwasheldbysocietyandhasshownthatthispositionhasbeen
institutionalized in English laws on infanticide which prescribe lesser penalties than
those for homicide as well as establish a very liberal insanity defence. The American
jurisprudential system has inherited, to a degree, the English attitudes toward the
infant as evidenced in state abortion statutes, Roe v. Wade, parental proxy-consent to
medical treatment, condonation ofeuthanasia ofdefective newborns, and the virtual
absence ofinfanticideprosecutions.
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